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REG IN ALD  HER SO LD  G REEN  
I
T o  Se ll Cheap And To  Buy D ear
President Julius Nyerere’s comment on the world economic 
order to a phalanx of its lenders in London svas:
the present international economic system gives us 
only two rights— the right to sell cheap and the right 
to buy dear.
The world of the transnational corporations (TNCs) is he 
heart of international commerce and finance today. It is a vro-'d 
in which it is critical to be iarge, wealthy, close to the ear or 
powerful states and able to acquire, use and monopolise in­
formation. it is no way Adam Sm ith’s worid of the “ invisible 
hand" of competition which made the individualism of each 
serve the good of ail. It is the world of the descendants of Clive 
of India and the British East India Company— bodies Smith 
condemned ruthlessly. It is a world of a few iarge firms who 
often can and do meet to agree on at least limit■ d lines of joint 
action and general principles of dealing with outsiders— a 
practice not unknown to Smith who warned that businessmen 
seldom meet even for convivial or social purposes without 
conspiring against the common good.
This is a world of unequal exchange in several senses. Raw 
materials are usually sold by competitors to oligopsonists— 
attempts by producer states to unite are resisted. Processing 
and manufacturing— usually the sour.re of at least four times 
as much value added as raw material production— are con­
centrated jn the centre. I ransfer pricing (international sales 
which are intra-TNC because the l NC  group controls both 
companies) allow moving earnings, tax payments, investible 
surp.uses about at the stroke of a pen— moves usually 
tending to put them into the centre and out of 
the periphery and thus draining surplus as surely as if with 
more decorum, respect ' for Rga! principles and (usually) less 
avert v.o.erce than, the administration of Governor Warren 
n w u r js  (who W „  also “ not goiity”  under the laws and 
SU'rtfs'ci then pertj.n.nr in the centre)
 ^TNCs will not go away. About 75% of the First and Third 
W o r ld ’s trade and 50°^ of their manufacturing is handled by 
them. They do operate with considerable technical, production 
and information application efficiency. Simple destruction is 
not desirable, viable alternatives— including not nationalisa­
tion of domestic firms— are only sometimes relevant. W hat is 
needed is a level of consciousness, of observation, of political 
mobilisation (by workers, peasants and associated intellec­
tuals— professionals, managers, decision takers), of enforced 
national legal codes to make the TNCs safe (or safer) for the 
world. Calis to mutual goodwill and comradeship are ill con­
sidered. A TNC  must centre its concerns on medium term 
global profit and the movement of surplus to the best invest­
ment opportunities, whereas a state (capitalist or socialist) is 
concerned with national production, distribution and invest­
ment. Further given the size difference an African proverb is 
appropriate “ when the elephant lies down with the chicken, 
it is the chicken who is crushed.”
The Se lf  Reliance o f the Rich
A new slogan in the platforms of rich countries is “ self 
reliance” . W hat is this “ self reliance of the rich” ? Its most 
striking example is the European Economic Community’s 
Common Agricultural Policy and especially its sugar subsector. 
Little Europe (EEC ) grows beet sugar at a cost well above 
tropica! cane sugar. It “ generously”  accepts about 1.2 million 
tonnes of periphery economy cane at prices linked to its own 
domestic ones. But it turns around and dumps a larger amount 
of excess beet on the world markets, rendering the Inter­
national Sugar Agreement (which it refuses to join) nearly 
powerless and lowering cane export proceeds by far more than 
the gain they receive on its imports. “ Self Reliance”  in that 
context looks remarkably like exclusion and aggression.
O f course EECs is not activated by malice and a conscious 
quest for hypocrisy. Beet grov/ers are a part of the powerful 
European agricultural lobbies. The easy solution— unless and 
until the Third W orld  organises and delays its potential power 
better— is to placate these lobbies (a mixed peasant/capitalist 
farmer sub-class) by hampering Third W orld  access to European 
markets and dumping abroad. The structures of inequality 
remain because there are those (including workers and pea­
sants) who benefit by them and because the successful creation 
of inequality has reduced and divided the power of those 
(whether in the centre or on the periphery) who seek to 
change them.
These and other aspects of the Old International Economic 
Order have often been described as malfunctioning. One must
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ask "malfunctioning for whom " ? For the workers and peasants 
of Asia— yes. For those who erected and ran the system— at 
least in the short run— no. 1945-70 has been described by 
friends and moderate critics as the "golden age of capitalist 
industrial economies". 1977-8? is another matter— the new 
International Economic Disorder falls (albeit not equally) on 
the just and unjust, the centre and the periphery. However, 
the leaders of O ECD  states and their analysts see the way 
ahead as being back to a slightly refurbished old order, not 
forward to— say— the Charter of the Economic Rights and 
Duties of States.
W hat can lawyers and the law do? Not, one should admit 
at once, alter basic power balances or substitute for the 
absence of power. Law can lead, but it can do so only when 
it also embodies and acts from value premises and power 
potentials.
In respect to Transnational Codes of Conduct— a subject on 
which the proponents of codes from absence of legal expertise 
are in danger of offering proposals better designed to make 
the world safe for TNCs then visa versa— a possible set of 
practical ways forward include:
a. to require disclosure of data on relevant (frequently 
extraterritorial) operations to national governments and 
control agencies;
b. to relate taxes to real surplus earned in a country if 
necessary using proxy bases (like the Jamaica tax on 
bauxite producers related to the world market price of 
aluminium not the intra-company “ sale”  price of 
bauxite) as appropriate;
c. to consider how we can reverse the pattern where the 
state is an actor regulating the weak (by enforcing res­
trictions on eligibility for rice, not a right to eat) and a 
bystander holding the scales for the rich (eg. re policy 
decisions of BAT) so that— at least— the law recognises 
the reality that vis-a-vis large enterprises (especiallyTNCs 
but also domestic including public sector ones) the state 
is an actor with definite interests and goals which are 
either made enforceable at law or let go by default;
d. devise national codes enforceable under national law and 
procedure (and preferably in national courts or, as a 
second best, by arbitral proceedings which are not so 
structured as to put the state at a disadvantage);
c. consider how these codes might be harmonised (by up­
grading not diluting) among periphery states 3.nd whether 
(T a t aii) an international Charter setting minimum (not
maximum) standards for national action could assist in 
securing international cognisance of national code based 
decisions and in getting TN C  home state cooperation in 
enforcing disclosure of global activity information both in 
general and when specifically sought by peripheral state 
regulating bodies.
Som e Lacunae In D rafting  and In te rp re ta tio n
In respect to getting access for Third W orld  exports to 
First W orld  markets debacles have arisen because the Third 
W orld  side has been ill (or sometimes not at all) supplied with 
expert drafting advice. The Lome Convention is a horror story 
in this respect. For example, contrary to ACP belief at the time, 
the convention gave no guarantee of any concessions on agri­
cultural products (other than sugar) subject to, or potentially 
subject to. the Common Agricultural Policy— a range con­
ceivably running from unmilled paddy through chocolate candy 
to shoes! Worse, as written (3nd subsequently altered only ex 
gratia and on a year to year basis), it imposed taxes on Bots­
wana’s existing beef exports to the UK  that could have reduced 
Botswana cattle growers’ net income by over 90% and pre­
sumptively wiped out a quarter of Botswana’s exports.
More generally the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) provisions in Article X IX  in respect to special restric­
tions on imports are quite unsatisfactory. They do not really set 
a time limit, nor require phasing out, nor require adjustment by 
the importer to remove the cause of the special limitation. Nor 
in m3ny cases do they require that compensatory concessions 
be given if that aggrieved party is a Third W orld  state because 
many provisions— eg. the so called Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences (G SP)— are deemed to be ex gratia not negotiated 
and thereby revocable at will. Further, the so-called “ voluntary 
quota’’ agreements First W orld  states have imposed on their 
Third W orld  trade “ partners”  are on the face of it in clear 
breach of GATT but to date no formal references have been 
made. Part of the problem is one of power but part is knowing 




Dorn Helder Camara, Archbishop of Recife has written:
In the second half of the 19th century the sign of the 
liberation of a port was “ no slaves landed here” . In the 
second half of the 20th century the sign of the libera­
tion of a pert should be “ no unprocessed primary 
products shipped here” .
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There is little disagreement that in general the raising of 
levels of productive forces requires diverisficatior. and struc­
tural integration. Primary production alone is rarely either 
adequate or “ natural” — processing, manufacturing, marketing 
are its logical counterparts. For small economies that neces­
sarily means exports of manufactured goods and especially of 
those based on their earlier raw materialexports i.e. packeted, 
branded tea not bulk, steel not iron ore, sisal twine not fibre, 
shoes not hides and skins, garments not raw cotton. That, how­
ever, is not how the world economy— especially under the 
new International Economic Disorder and the pressures of the 
centre economies’ “ New Protectionism” — is proceeding.
G A T T ’s Tokyo Round— its 1970s exercise in major reduction 
in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade— is likely to prove a 
disaster for the Third W orld . W h y?
1. G A TT ’s procedures are so complex that a minimum of 20 
full time professionals and a global data collection system 
are needed to play “ the GATT game” . Further, because 
bilateral concessions once agreed must be generalised to 
all states it is suicidal to negotiate with anyone other than 
the “ Big Three” —Japan, EEC, USA ;
2. Therefore, what that trio can triangularly agree is almost 
unchallengeable and what any one of them rejects almost 
unnegotiable— a situation as alarming to the smaller 
industrial economies (eg. the Nordic Group) as to the 
members of the Group of 77 (the Third W orld  caucus in 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop­
ment— UN CTAD ).
3. The “ Big Three”  are not interested in lowering barriers 
to trade on goods in which they face serious competition 
from outsiders, thus GATT has regularly reduced bar­
riers to trade in the manufactured exports of key con­
cern to the centre more than on those of present or 
potential concern to the periphery (eg. computers not 
shirts, complex chemicals not shoes, jet aircraft not 
tw in e );
A. In this round they have virtually ignored the general 
guideline agreed in the governing body (where the mem­
bers of the 77 are in a majority and thus have a real voice) 
for removal of trade barriers to tropical products includ­
ing processed forms; it raises some uncomfortable issues 
for the Big Three— not least in respect to sugar. W hile a 
reconsideration has been forced by the 77, it is a recon­
sideration by the Big Three not a real negotiation in which 
the 77 could partic.pate.
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T h e  M F A : Menacing Foreclosure o f Access
Meanwhile, the 1978 updating of the longterm Muitifibre 
Textile and Garment Arrangements (MFA) has done several 
times as much damage to the Third W orld  as the Tokyo Round 
will produce gains:
1. the new quotas are “ enforced”  unilaterally not negotiat­
ed :
2. they represent another step in reducing access and raising 
uncertainty for Third W orld  textile and garment ex­
porters;
3. for major exporters the base allowed is 1976 (not the 
much higher 1978) exports and the growth 2 %  a year so 
that the entire 1979-83 period will see lo w er allowed 
exports (in quantity terms) than 1978;
4. the Third W orld exporters notably failed to make a 
common stand and were picked off one by one— their 
refusal to hang together meant that each was hung 
separately;
5. made easier the recent US promises to its textile pro­
ducers to introduce new restrictions beyond those con­
tained in the supposedly mutually binding 1978 MFA;
•6. violated all the formal principles (and indeed genuine 
goals) of GATT of freed and more assured access and to 
add insult to injury been registered as a GATT protocol.
This is the “ New Protectionism”  on the march— “ let them 
export cotton”  is its apparent answer to the victims. Nor is it 
isolated— there are other if less stringent and narrower product 
based parallels. Further there is an ominous upsurge of calls to 
take general action against the “ Newly Industrialising Coun­
tries”  (eg. India, Hong Kong, Singapore, both Korea, Brazil, 
Mexico, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, Rumania and for the more enthu­
siastic axemen such states as the Philippines too; can Sri Lanka 
be far behind especially if its manufactured export strategy 
begins to succeed ?) on the basis that their moderate success in 
building competitive manufactured goods export sectors proves 
both that they offer “ unfair”  (read effective) competition and 
that they can today be classed together with Japan (which 
really does operate a predatory, globally destabilizing export 
led growth strategy and malignly neglects its impact on the 
global economy and which really is a first rank industrial 
economy).
Indeed it is not too much to say that today the p e r ip h e ra l 
economies— despite poultices like GSP at the Lome Conven­
tion— “ enjoy”  Least Favoured Nation status, not the “ Most
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Favoured Nation”  treatment GATT is supposed to afford to 
all its members. In that sense the International Law Commis­
sion’s study of what problems arose from ‘‘most favoured 
nation”  status when formal equality was paralleled by sub­
stantive inequality is a trifle premature— the MFA is the symbol 
and the torchbearer of a growing formal inequality, of the 
industrial economies pulling up the drawbridge and lowering 
the portcullis of their protectionist castle against the periphery 
exports knocking at their doors.
Tow ard  a W o rk a b le  T rad e  O rgan isation  C h a rte r
Once the goals on the trade access and negotiation side are 
clarified the next steps are to see where and how GATT s 
formal structures militate against them and what structural 
(constitutional, Article Amendment) changes might facilitate 
achieving those goals. To a very great extent those are steps 
for lawyers. Unfortunately they do not appear to be steps many 
Third W orld  Lawyers have been asked or volunteered to take.
Clearly a number of “ constitutional”  and “ contract ’ law 
points area at stake:
a. how can the formal majority in the governing body be 
used to inform actual detailed negotiations?
b. what procedural changes (eg. joint regional or 77 negotiat­
ing teams and/or offers?) could open up the negotiating 
process to periphery participation?
c. how can the cancerous growth of extra and anti-GATT 
restrictive “ agreements”  be halted by bringing all res­
trictive proposals within GATT  (where there is a bias 
against more barriers to trade) to be negotiated there?
d. how can the GATT provisions in respect of restrictions 
be redesigned to cover duration, phasing out, domestic 
adjustment policies of the imposing industrial economy?
e. what formal statement of restriction negotiation could be 
used— like an IMF “ Letter of Intent” — to cause GATT 
monitoring of performance?
f. how could an arbitral procedure be built into G A lT  to 
resolved deadlocked negotiations on restrictions and/or 
claims of violation (especially when the GATT monitoring 
noted such violations)?
Of course these are matters of substance as well as form. But 
much— r.ct a!!— of the substance is legal 3nd even on other 
aspects lawyers can be invaluable consultants.
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U sing  the Law
A rather different and more mundane situation pertains in 
respect to sisal twine. Tanzania has expanded sisal twine capa­
city to 40%  of fibre output (60% by 1980 paralleled by sisal 
sack capacity of 30% of fibre by the mid 1980s, thus nearing 
the goal of manufacturing and using domestically nearly 100% 
of this raw material— the first case in which the response to 
President Nyerere’s pointed use of Dorn Helder Camara’s 
words on his 1972 Christmas cards is approaching fulfilment). 
Domestic use is trivial— this is a case of increasing the value of 
exports and the employment of Tansanians not of directly 
integrating the product into the national supply/use pattern. 
Exports have been largely to North America, Scandinavia and 
secondary markets not to the core EEC states despite the fact 
that half the capacity is in plants which are subsidiaries of, or 
joint ventures with, EEC sisal twine spinners and wholesaler. 
In 1977— after Tanzania state owned mills began to sell direct 
to secondary wholesalers in the EEC core and Tanzania put 
pressure on the private firms to use their own wholesale links 
to sell Tanzania twine in Europe— the private firms de facto 
halted effective marketing of the twine forcing sharp fall in 
output.
In fact there is a cartel of half a dozen to a dozen spinners/' 
wholesalers/importers in four to six EEC states. It has limited 
twine imports in order to protect its own (less competitive) 
home mills and has used its dominant position in importing and 
producing to discourage other wholesalers from going outside 
the cartel. Tanzania certainly protested and— with its history 
of nationalising firms who thwarted its goals and then working 
out how to keep them operating and selling— to some point. 
By mid 1978 the firms had negotiated to take Tanzania sisal 
twine for their EEC markets and had returned to full produc­
tion.
W here then is the legal side? In practice only subliminally 
in the power of Tanzania to nationalise. W hat neither the 
Sisal Authority, the Ministry of Agriculture nor the Attorney 
General’s Chambers seem to have realised was that this cartel 
is almost certainly unlawful under the provisions of the Treaty 
of Rome. EEC requires registration of cartels (including de 
facto ones claiming to be something else) and has the obligation 
to  ban those not clearly in the public interest. Price raising and 
market domination are not acceptable reasons. Thus Tanzania 
had every reason— had it known— to take the case to the EEC. 
On the demonstrated actions of thecompaniesand their letters 
to it, prima facie evidence of an unlawful cartel was readily 
■available. Had EEC officials refused to investigate v/ith a view to 
taking action (including legal action, a fairly common resort in
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competition and cartel cases), the refusal could have been 
raised politically at ACP and governmental level. Indeed the 
cartel’s German and Dutch members were (are) on the face 
of it quite possibly in breach of their own national anti-mono­
poly and anti-restraint of competition codes.
Perhaps this approach would not have worked. A t the least 
it seemed (seems) worth exploring and would put pressure 
on the parties in further negotiations (at least one is very- 
alarmed whenever the issue is raised even by quite unofficial 
persons). Unfortunately there is good reason to believe this 
case is far from unique. Third W orld  governments and enter­
prises do not often ask their lawyers what First W orld  legal 
instruments and statutes might be of use to them and how they- 
could be activated.
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A  System  T h a t Se lls  Peop le
In 1971 the “ contract”  (single migrants at sub-subsistence 
wages on something closely resembling “ indentured labour” ' 
contracts) workers of Namibia struck against their bondage, 
the destruction of their family life, their sub-family subsistence 
wages. One of their spokesmen said:
W e  do not believe 
in a system that 
sells people.
Unless subject to effective state control, a system of autono- 
moustransnational enterprises (even public sector ones)almost 
inevitably “ sells people”  even if not always with the nakedness 
and violence of Namibia under South African occupation. The 
main duty of an enterprise manager is to the enterprise and its 
owners. To carry out that duty he must seek to achieve high 
levels of surplus generation, of opportunities to invest that 
surplus and of ability to reproduce the surplus and investment 
in the future. The welfare of communities, past (e.g. dismissed 
or moved away from) employees and states (or at least host 
states— a public sectorTNC may have a concern for home state 
economic welfare) cannot be central to his concerns. True, his 
three key goals do require that he pay attention to contexts—  
including state policy, power, laws and enforcement. Avoiding 
(or quietly evading if investigation and enforcement are weak) 
laws, not defying them, is the prudent T N C  approach to regula­
tions which hinder it; at least a certain degree of compliance 
with state strategy’s clearly set out and backed both by law 
and by capacity to enforce it is good business practice. That is 
the basis of one of the three reasons T N C ’i  are seen as less- 
car^trous by industrialized capitalist economy states and
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public opinion— they are more effectively regulated and pushed 
into responding to state goals to achieve their own. The 
second is that TN C  s — in their home countries— are so perva­
sive and so much a part of normal life that most people and 
officials simply do not see them as a problem. Third, T N C ’s on 
balance transfer surpluses from peripheral to central econo­
mies— a process which is beneficial to many sectors of the 
recipients (and not just larger capitalists) and crippling to the 
loosers.
M anipu lated  T ransfer P ric ing
A key method of moving surplus is manipulated transfer 
pricing (or accounting or billing or financing). A T N C , by defini­
tion, has units in several countries. Transactions— sales and 
purchases of goods, service contracts, royalties, interest, etc.—  
between such units constitute international transactions but 
intrafirm transfers. In any such case the prices are transfer—  
not market— prices. In itself that is not an abuse. The difficulty 
is that these transfer prices can be set in a way which moves 
surplus actually earned in one state to another resulting in a 
loss of foreign exchange, taxes, investible surplus and— perhaps 
— higher wages and prices to domestic employees/suppliers. 
The dominant reason is probably to have the profits appear in 
a convertible currency useable for investment and dividend 
payments anywhere in the world. The second reason is to have 
profits appear in states with low or nil effective profit tax 
rates— apparently an especially critical element in banking and 
insurance. The third is to disguise true profits if showing them 
would “ invite”  the host state to deny tax concessions, raise 
taxes, lower import duty protection, nationalize or host state 
workers and producers to demand higher wages or prices. 
Each of these purposes is consistent with what are necessarily 
the dominant goals of TN C  managers— surplus, investment 
possibilities, chance to have future surpluses and investment 
possibilities.
Results analogous to common ownership or management 
(Gecomines, The Zaiirean state copper company, appears to be 
a massive looser by transfer pricing because of effective manage­
ment control by a Societe Generale group firm even though it 
is 100% state owned and a formally independent enterprise) 
can result from unequal knowledge. The Nairobi Tea Auction 
prices appear to be 20-30% below UK  market prices not over 
half of which can be accounted for by transport/marketing 
costs and not over a quarter by sales from East African planta­
tion subsidiaries to marketing companies of the same group. 
Even greater discrepancies exist in East African hide prices 
paid by brokers and their immediate resale prices to tanners 
and shoemakers even though no transfer pricing proper arises
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here, merely a de facto broker monopoly on knowledges of 
both the actual sellers and the actual users and their dependa­
bility, credit worthiness, etc.
The Openings For M an ipu lators
Transfer pricing’s manipulation is made possible byfour main 
weaknesses:
1. inadequate knowledge— e.g. as to non-manipulated prices,, 
alternative buyers or suppliers— on the part of Third 
W orld  States;
2. inadequate negotiation of contracts and other arrange­
ments with T N C ’s (e.g. the sweeping tax concessions 
offered when what empirical evidence there is shows that 
tax holidays are rarely a crucial factor in TN C  foreign 
investment);
3. lack of adequate legal frameworks (e.g. requiring the 
divulging of adequate data, providing for binding indepen­
dent analysis of prices) to control TN C  practices;
4. unequal power because no alternative to the TN C  exists 
for a specific purpose (e.g. the Central Selling Organisa­
tion in diamonds which is at one and the same time an 
effective sellers’ cartel and an instrumentality of the 
Oppenheimer Group’s de Beers branch) or becuase no 
alternative is known (e.g. in simple industries such as 
glass a seller may give an illusion that only he can provide 
a machinery— knowhow— credit package when at least a 
score of alternatives exist unknown to the Third W orld  
party).
Building up knowledge collection and analysis capacity is a 
first necessary step. Sometimes that is easy. For example over 
1973-1978 one could compute the intermediate marketing 
company margin on petroleum from prices of oil and tanker 
rates regularly published in the Petroleum Economist— at least 
two small states saved themselves several million dollars doing 
precisely that before agreeing import prices for oil with major 
T N C ’s. Sometimes it is very complex— e.g. to calculate the 
“ proper”  transfer price for components e.g. parts of machines, 
or lorry drive shafts may require an engineer and a cost accoun­
tant. It is rarely impossible.
Once the information is acquired, it must be analysed to test 
the reasonableness of transfer (and other) prices. If the results 
show divergences decisions must be taken on what changes to 
seek, from whom, by what means (e.g. Jamaica changed its 
tax from bauxite prices proper to aluminium because there 
rc apparant way to determine a “ normal" bauxite price. 
T*nx*nii nationalized a meat packing firm because the domestic
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export price setting issues were really insoluble within a joint 
venture). Much of the action will involve lawyers: drafting new 
legal instruments and then applying them; negotiating new 
contracts; possibly prosecuting offenders and, at the least, 
preparing prosecutable cases to secure out of court settlements.
N a m ib ia : The Po lit ica l Econom y of The ft
A starker case is that of Namibia. Here one has what can 
only be described as the political economy of theft. Theft of 
political sovereignty so the state becomes a coercive instrument 
against the people. Theft of land— including mineral and fishing 
rights— so that settlers and foreign companies can have invest­
ment and profit opportunities. Theft of more land— so that the 
people have the choice of working for the settlers, foreign 
firms or starving. Theft of right to choose employers or resid­
ence— so that below family subsistence wages can be paid to 
“ contract”  (indentured) workers while their families scratch 
(or herd) out an income supplement in the “ reserves” . Any 
settler or company— whatever its desires— operating in 
Namibia is a beneficiary of and an accomplice to a system of 
theft. (One may— given the pervasive flows of surplus from 
periphery to centre— argue this much more generally, but the 
connection between wages in the U K  and the price of Sri Lanka 
tea is so different in degree as to be different in kind from the 
" ‘theft of Namibia” /profit of Rossing Uranium nexus).
Rossi ng Uranium— at 5,000 tonnes capacity one of the world ’s 
iargest uranium oxide producers with a full capacity turnover 
o f $500 million, a direct capital cost of the order of $450 million 
and an annual operating surplus of the order of $250 million 
p|us— is a case in point. South Africa (by the relevant date in 
illegal occupation of Namibia following the United Nations’ 
revocation of the mandate, a fact known to its partners) 
negotiated with a series of companies led by RTZ  to develop 
the mine. They negotiated a series of long term supply con­
tracts— at least the one to the UK  Nuclear Fules at a “ sweet­
heart”  price— to major nuclear energy producers. Most of the 
finance is South Africa, the management— technical expertise 
■and majority of the equity are R T Z ’s.
By the time the mine came into production in the middle 
1970’s, the International Court of Justice had affirmed the 
validity of the Mandate’s revocation, declared the South 
African presence illegal and concluded that any contracts pur­
portedly entered into orconcessions purportedly given by south 
Africa sequent to the Mandate’s revocation were void ab initio. 
The UN  had created the United Nations Council for Namibia 
as the successor to South Africa in regard to the legal powers 
o f the Mandate (albeit given the continued RSA occupation it
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could not exercise the majority of them) and it had legislated 
to forbid exports of Namibian natural resources.
Rossing— absolutely and in contrast to the least bad major 
employer (the Oppenheimer Group’s Consolidated Diamond 
f^jnes— a comparable isolated, high profit, technically complex 
mining and treatment enterprise)— provided below standard 
housing, wages and benefits. It quite overtly accepted the 
benefits of political economic theft in general, as well as in 
respect to its own mining “ rights” . In addition grave doubts 
exist as to the adequacy of its environmental protection mea­
sures against windblown radioactive dust and radiation hazards 
of miners and— especially— treatment plant workers. The 
complex is now nearing 80% of capacity, may well recover the 
whole capital cost by the end of 1979 and is selling without 
serious problems (possibly by “ swapping”  its oxide flown to 
Paris for Niger oxide to meet U K  and Japanese contracts in 
an inversion of the “ wash”  transactions carried out by oil 
companies and intermediaries to fuel the Rhodesian rebel 
regime).
Law , Po w er and M ob ilisation
The relevance of law and lawyers to both of the above cases 
is not hard to see. N or— hopefully— are its limitations. Until 
the excluded, exploited and oppressed (nationally and/or 
internationally) mobilize their power on the basis of self 
organisation to demand specific changes and are willing to act 
against those who reject significant change, the included, ex­
ploiters and oppressors will have little mutual interest (avoi­
dance of a worse result is a mutual interest) in negotiating 
structural change and the best formal pattern of lav/sand array 
of legal negotiating talent will disguise the reality of lack of 
change, not serve as instruments of change.
More specifically in the transfer pricing case a series of ques­
tions involving legal substance and form arise, inter alia:
1. requiring companies to submit data on both local and 
global operations in a form allowing independent verifica­
tion (or falsification);
2. setting up data collection channels in such a way that 
their results can be made binding (e.g. denial of import 
license or foreign exchange allocation, prima facie case 
shifting the burden of proof in a court proceeding);
3. removing obstacles to mutual use of information collected 
by government departments (often today statutorily 
restricted in respect not merely c f Tax Authorities but 
i'so of Statistical C ffces);
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4. negotiating action by home governments to enforce data 
disclosure by their T N C ’s (starting with cases like Sweden 
where evidence of willingness to legislate to contract, 
overseas actions of “ their”  T N C ’s exists);
5. creating institutional structures for contract filing and 
analysis and legal guidelines for approving or rejecting, 
them (as in the technology contract screening in Mexico, 
several Andean Pact countries and— perhaps less coherent­
ly— in India);
6. ensuring that the basic legislation relevant to these con­
trols takes account of the fact that the state is a party (not 
a disinterested arbiter) and places the burden of producing 
evidence on the firm either from the start or from the 
point at which a prima facie case of manipulated pricing 
is made out and further ensuring that the penalties for 
such offences are commensurate with the damage they 
can do to the economy and people (e.g. unlimited fine,, 
forfeiture of assets in the transaction, and/or 14 years 
imprisonment ceiling under some Tanzania Acts).
Rcssing— T h e  Law s Reproach o r Reproach to  Law yers?
In the Namibia case the silence of lawyers— with honourable 
exceptions— either on the political economy of theft (which 
may not raise justiciable issues but might be expected to 
appeal any lawyer who believes that “ natural law ” , “ common 
law”  and equity have anything to do with his profession) or 
the Rossing contracts has been deafening.
If law is at the base of liberal democratic (or bourgois) order 
and authority and the International Court of Justice is its 
highest organ in respect to international law, this silence is 
curious. Here is a legal opinion handed down (by a wide 
majority basically composed of libera! democratic lawyers) 
totally disregarded by a series of companies, to a high degree 
ignored by many states, flagrantly rejected by at least two 
(South Africa and the U K ). Lawyers are usually quicker to 
rally to the defense of the law.
W h a t  N e x t ?
If Namibia achieves independence because the mobilization 
of Namibian force (the SW A P O  army, held at bay to date but at 
a cost of S500 million a year to the Republic) and of foreign 
pressure (either for justice or for a “ peaceful”  transition 
limiting the involvement of other states) then the questions of 
Rossing (as of the aftermath of the political economy of theft 
in general, e.g. land “ rights” ) become of prime concern to 
Namibia’s government and its lav/yers:
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i .  is there— as it appears— a clear legal basis for the forfei­
ture of Rossing (and other post 1966 mines) without 
compensation to South Africa? to RTZ? to “ third party”  
bank lenders? How can it be best set out?
1. if not, since the “ concession”  was clearly void ab initio 
what— if any— are the legal constraints on rents, taxes 
royalties from the date of initial operation?
3. since— especially after the Council for Namibia order—  
any purchaser was on notice that Rossing oxide was 
stolen property what legal recourse has Namibia against 
such buyers? How likely is it to succeed in actions and in 
which jurisdictions?
4. in particular what legal action is possible to recover on 
sales made at below world prices on long term contracts 
interlocked with the Rossing mining “ contracts”  in such 
a way as— under the ICJ ruling— to make the purchaser 
de facto (and de ju re?) a “ receiver"?
5. given the ICJ ruling, the Rossing contracts would appear 
to be not merely void but to involve first conspiracies to 
commit and then committing of felonies (e.g. grand 
larceny). If this is correct, then a further issue arises—  
participants in felonies are normally responsible for side 
consequences of their actions (e.g. injuries and death 
resulting from method of construction and/or inadequate 
safeguards in respect of radiation). Do the contracts con­
stitute conspiracies to commit and then carrying out 
committing of felonies ? Are the consequential results also 
legally offences? If so, how can they be prosecuted, by 
whom, against whom (e.g. the signatories? the prime 
movers of the contracts? major managers and officials?)? 
W hat is the relevance of R T Z ’s defense that as the UK 
did not accept the ICJ ruling nothing it (R T Z ) did was in 
violation of British law?
6. assuming forfeiture of Rossing on the grounds of initial 
illegality, what legal obstacles to marketing of oxide may 
RTZ raise ? or South Africa ? or term contract purchasers ? 
(Can these be overcome (as they were in the somewhat 
congruent Chilean copper cases)? How?
These are not trivial questions— the potential output value 
is 5400 per Namibian and the potential surplus over $250. That 
is.de. Rossing has become a symbol of injustice and of foreign 
collaboration with South Africa to Namibians. No Namibian 
jovcrnmcn: cm afford politically to be seen to fail to act. The 
better its icgil advice, the more effective its actions are likely 
to oc-
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VO b je c t iv ity  o r Defense of Ex p lo ita tio n ?
The standard defense of existing legal norms is that they are
objective. It would be surprising if that were literally true__
laws and legal systems attempt to embody and to enforce 
certain values and to require or to prevent (or sanction)
certain acts. Laws are not “ objective”  about murder they
embody a condemnation and provide severe sanctions. No
more can one assume economic laws are objective “ caveat
emptor”  (let the buyer beware) is hardly objective when the 
seller is large and strong and the buyer not, laws forbidding 
“ bond”  labour are not “ objective”  among different types of 
labour relations or sub-modes of production. The central 
problem of international economic law (public or private)- 
has been posed by Idriss Jezairy of Algeria:
How many times more will the law hide behind the 
necessity to respect established regimes or a purported 
objectivity compatible with colonialism, diverse forms 
of racial discrimination, with neo-colonialism and the 
exploitation of man by man ?. . . international law like 
national law is never neutral to political options.
These characteristics are not unique to First W o rld — Third 
W orld  transactions. However, within at least many industrial 
economies, legislation to protect the customer, the trade 
union,thesmall firm, the worker and the state has some impact 
2 nd in transactions among large enterprises each usually is able 
to afford the time and talent to know and make use of the legal 
framework. Neither characteristic usually pertains to Third 
W orld  parties to contracts with industrial economy based 
enterprises. Two fields in which the resultant difficulties are 
particularly severe are knowledge purchase or hire contracts 
and major engineering or plant and equipment contracts.
Know ledge is P ro f it
Arguably knowledge capital has superceeded finance and 
industrial capital as the dominant form. The knowledge of how 
to make, to sell, to buy, to organise, to procure finance com­
prises the key asset of many T N C ’s. Their ability to sustain 
and expand surpluses and to find ways to reinvest them 
depends on their ability to produce, acquire, analyze, reorga­
nise and apply hard (e.g. machinery) and soft (e.g. marketing 
data) technology. Not all knowledge is directly translatable 
into power and profit— only that which— whether by patent­
ing or, probably more important, control over use in ways 
preventing or delaying its acquisition by others— can be made 
the property of a firm and either used or sold (or rented) by 
it rather than becoming part of the general store of know-
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.•ledge. Further, not all profitable knowledge has an/ base 
beyond psychological preferences themselves built up by 
advertising e.g. any competent food chemist with a moderate 
laboratory can effectively duplicate the Coca Cola formula 
within a year and water taste differences are fargreaterthanthe 
divergences among many cola drink formulas, but acquired (or 
rather expensively promoted) tastes mean that the “ right”  to 
produce Coca Cola is a very valuable one in most market and 
even some socialist states.
Knowledge can be bought in a variety of forms. Patents, 
copyrights, trademarks can be leased (licensed) for royalties or 
for a lump sum. So can particular bits of knowhow or a flow 
of knowledge developments. Particular services— e.g. market­
ing or finance raising— can be procured by contract. Know­
ledge embodied in human beings can be hired— individually, 
from consultants, as part of knowledge sale contracts. Know­
ledge embodied in plant, equipment or programmes (e.g. the 
Kalamazoo accounting system, computer programmes) can be 
purchased.
W h a t  is A cq u ired ?
W hat type— or level— of knowledge has been acquired 
varies— partly w ith 'what has been purchased but even more 
with the national training, research, development, adaptation 
framework into which it is fitted. A t one extreme, foreign 
experts work foreign machines so the knowledge permanently 
transfered is nil— all there is the temporary use of foreign know­
ledge e.g. at least in its initial stages the Sri Lanka light bulb 
factory. A t the other a single sample machine or the right to 
use a process for a lump sum payment leads directly to local 
personnel training, adaptation, machine manufacture, sub­
sequent innovation i.e. the knowledge is rapidly incorporated 
into the national enterprises’ own knowledge capital— the 
usual situation in Japan which is by far the world ’s largest 
importer of knowledge capital not embodied in plant and 
equipment.
Knowledge is often sold or leased with limits on its use, 
adaptation or incorporation into local “ stocks ”  of knowledge. 
The quantity, quality or type of product may be limited or its 
export controlled or forbidden. Adaptations may be forbidden 
or may become the property of the lessor (seller) not the 
innovator. Retransfer of the knowledge and/or building the 
plant and equipment embodying it may be limited or forbidden.
Pa rti cu lar Purchasing Prob lem s
Evidently these characteristics of the knowledge business 
rasr p'-oDlems for Third W orld  (and other) buyers and
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1. it is difficult to know what one needs, whether what is 
offered is suitable, what any particular piece of knowledge 
will be worth to a degree quite different from that per­
taining to standard goods or services;
2. estimating the cost of the knowledge to the seller (and 
especially the cost of creation or profits on use given up 
by selling to any particular Third W orld  buyer) is v ir­
tually impossible so that the profit margin on many 
transactions is a matter of conjecture;
3. the absence of knowledge very often means that alter­
native sources of knowledge (e.g. a market research 
service or an office staffed by hired experts instead of a 
commodity broker) are not known so that the true costs 
of the alternative cannot be calculated by the buyer;
4. absence of knowledge makes it very hard to assess claims 
for apparently similar, assertedly unique or purportedly 
more appropriate pieces of knowledge— is the simpler,, 
cheaper tractor really useable? is there only one float 
glass process? are the dozens of competing bottle making, 
apparatus broadly comparable?
5. in the case of embodied knowledge what is the true cost 
of the machinery excluding the proprietorial knowledge 
and what is the knowledge charge is not an easy question 
to answer without sophisticated machine design and cosc. 
accounting knowledge;
6. what part of the knowledge need be purchased, and how 
much in the way of items (knowledge or goods and 
services) which could be produced or acquired by the 
enterprise (or state) itself are being included, is often a 
key question as is the related one— are the other pieces 
of the package overpriced ?
7. for a state, the issue arises to what extent are technology 
and knowledge imports preventing the development of 
local capacity (whether in user firms or specialist enter­
prises) and thereby raising a case for “ infant knowledge 
industry’’ or “ foreign exchange saving”  protection 
measures?
One could continue, but the points that knowledge is a key 
import, one traded in a complex and imperfect market and 
raising major problems of contract negotiation (or even know­
ing what to negotiate for!) are made. In these fields legal 
instruments are usually none too helpful a guide— the law has- 
lagged in dealing with this branch of commerce especially ir> 
respect of forms more modern than patents— trademarks 
copyrights or issues more complex than taxation.
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P e r f o r m a n c e  and P e n a l t i e s
Most major civ,I engineering or complete plant or manage­
ment contracts do not have workable two way performance 
guarantees with effective means of enforcing them. From the 
Third W orld  point of view these standard defects in contracts 
are a one way street to losses from non-performance costs not 
recoverable from the defaulting party— after all these are all 
■categories in which the Third W orld  as a whole imports from 
the First and Second. (W ith in the Third W orld  the situation is 
more complex e.g. Sri Lanka doubtless looses to India on this 
set of standard contract weaknesses.)
In construction, penalties for failing to complete on time are 
usually absent or so limited as to be derisory relative to costs 
of delay to the buyer. Fixed price contracts are rare and the 
•degree of justification needed for cost overrun claims varies 
widely (from derisory to lenient)— the sole exception being 
■certain Middle Eastern states who probably pay by extortionate 
-initial contract prices. Failure to meet guaranteed specifica­
tions usually incurs some penalty but rarely the waiting time 
cost to the buyer. Payments are usually made on a schedule 
which leaves only a minimal final payment which can be with­
held against claims and standard performance bond cover 
appears to be around 10% of the contract sum. Against de­
signers, consultants, engineers the ability to claim— e.g. if a 
design is in practice unuseable and redesign during construc­
tion doubles costs— is usually even lower and the practical 
•chances of collection near negligible.
The same general problems bedevil plant and equipment 
■contracts and management agreements. In the former test run 
•guarantees are common— actual performance is normal opera­
tion over several years less so— substantial post completion 
performance bonds rare— liability for loss of profits from failure 
to perform virtually unheard of. These are not small issues— 
in a single case involving an Algerian gas Iiquification plant, 
•completed (after redesign) years late, the cross claims for late 
delivery, redesign, loss of profits on the one hand and added 
costs on the other approach $2,000 million. In the case of 
management contracts, actual performance guarantees are 
virtually unknown and clauses providing for penalties for non­
performance are even rarer— indeed so bad are most such 
contracts in this respect that the only remedy for an incom­
petent management contractor is to fire him and seek in 
legation or arbitration to limt his claims for “ breach”  or 
premature termination” .
x  W a r n i n g  E x a m p l e
• cr example,let us take adraft contract for a moderate sized 
< - Supplier— vc 'y  large to the importing state, huge in
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terms of previous ventures of the local entrepreneurs) plant 
using standard, fairly widely available technology to be built 
in a small poor (say 15 million population S3,000 million Gross 
Domestic Product) peripheral economy. The cost of the plant 
is given in one line with no technical specifications, no perfor­
mance guarantee, no deadline for completion. The knowledge 
transfer cost is another single line item without specification 
or guarantee.
Payment to the supplier is to be by an external financing 
body on the basis of self certified claims by the supplier not* 
it appears, challengeable by the purchaser. As there are no 
performance guarantees, the issue of performance bonds does 
not arise. Payment to the external financing body is to be 
guaranteed by two major domestic commercial banks and is 
independent of whether the plant is on time, able to produce 
desired quantities of saleable quantity or even— on a quite 
plausible reading— delivered and made to function at all.
This is a particularly bad example of an unbalanced contract. 
However, it is not unique. Hundreds of such contracts are “ on 
offer”  today. A decade ago they were the norm for TNC/ 
Third W orld  enterprise (public or private) transactions; even 
today they remain the standard in a not negligible number of 
Third W orld  economies.
A  Q u a lif ica tio n
Doubtless there are problems on the other side. W ith  present 
rates of inflation, fixed price contracts (or even limited cost 
overrun ones) can be a speedy route to bankruptcy. Guarantee­
ing performance during operation by others is not without 
risk (e.g. a qualified engineer— in this case Western European—  
may turn off the alarm on a pressure guage because its ringing 
irritates him with a resultant pipe burst putting a 100,000 
tonne fertilizer plant out of action). W hen a contractor de­
pends on designs or plans from client or consultant, who is to 
blame if he cannot execute them is rarely an open and shut 
issue. Large, long term performance bonds are costly— especial­
ly because they are rare so insurance companies find it hard 
to assess risk or build up an adequate range of contracts to 
achieve a balanced claim record.
However, what cannot be denied is that in this field the law 
is by no means balanced and objective as embodied either in' 
statute or in contracts. Caveat emptor remains very much alive.
Princ ip les, Practices and M ethods
Both of the foregoing areas are ones in which the warnings 
that principles are not self implementing and that slogans are
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co-cp:2t'e  2 "c peculiarly opposite. To argue that all kr,ov.!cdge 
should be made available free is either advocacy of a socialist 
world government with all knowledge development a central 
government charge (advocacy which goes rather beyond know­
ledge creation or, for that matter, this paper) or hopelessly 
unrealistic. Advocacy of fairly determined prices based on 
adequate disclosure is a practicable principle, and one which 
can be embodied in national legislation, but it is not a principle 
which operates itself. The slogans for a Code to cover transfer 
of technology have already led to the W orld  Intellectual Pro­
perty Organisation (the first UN  agency primarily for the 
defense of TN C  interests) and even in the presumptively more 
favourable forum of U N C TA D  to the astounding secretariat 
proposal that for technology transfer code purposes the law of 
contract should be left open to negotiation— a reversal of what 
many Third W orld  states (notably Latin America via the 
“ Calvo Clause”  and India) have fought tooth and nail, contract 
by contract, forum by forum to achieve for up to five decades!
Solutions require nuts and bolts to hold a framework and 
its articulation together— many of them legal nuts and bolts. 
The debacle in respect to the code could have been avoided by 
utilizing Third W orld  lawyers with both experience in, and 
knowledge of the history of, the “ choice of law ”  issue. More 
generally— or rather more particularly— the codification of 
guidelines for determining whether a price is fair or perfor­
mance clauses are adequate and balanced requires a combina­
tion of legal drafting, contract law, engineering and design, 
cost accounting and economic analysis talent. Even then negotia­
ting individual contracts to make effective use of the guidelines 
will require the same array of expert advice.
W ip e  out W IP O
One field of knowledge transactions and especially its apex 
institution— the W orld  Intellectual Property Organization—  
appears worthy of particular legal attention. W IP O  is the UN 
family successor to a previous private international body 
(B1RPI— Bureau for Protection of Intellectual Property Rights). 
Its avowed purpose is to protect the incomes of those holding 
patents, trademarks, copyrights. Basically the holders are 
■ 'T’T s— the individual holders of really valuable rights are 
already rare and becoming rarer and the exceptions rapidly 
became ; NC s in their own right e.g. Polaroid, Xerox. Only 
~ T  ^ese pieces of paper encourage knowledge creation 
Coes not base its knowledge creation on patentability, 
r*or do university researchers, trademark registrability decs 
advertising and image creation but arguably a'cng 
cf "disinformation”  not information: copyright may 
T~,~rt  uu 'u l in encouraging publishers but can hardly be
33
s .o p ru d  '.a c ? : : :  most authors including the present one who 
vs - ;» 'o ' c- te drferent reasons).
W -a: trademarks, copyrights, patents do is to create statu­
t o r y  monopolies over pieces of knowledge, thereby assisting 
them owners in extracting monopoly profits from their sale 
and preventing others from reinventing or copying them. On 
the face of it hardly a plausible purpose for a UN  agency (un­
less one also argues for winding up both UNESCO , the UN 
Transnational Centre and the Technology Transfer division of 
U N C TAD !). The cure for once is simple— not reform W IP O  
but wipe it out and transfer its legitimate concerns to UN ESCO  
(copyrights) and UN C TA D  (patents). The omission of trade­
marks is not accidental— the author sees no legitimate case for 
them as property rights, they are not subject to abuse but 
constitute an abuse.
Possib le N a tio n a l Leg is lation  Guidelines
Perhaps more important are questions of national legisla­
tion. Some working guidelines might include:
1. registering foreign patents fairly freely but on condition 
that they must be licensed or worked within three years 
of registration or become subject to compulsory licens­
ing to domestic firms at state set fees;
2. using inventors fees and research support grants (or tax 
offsets) to back domestic research including copying 
selected foreign technology and providing a mechanism to 
encourage licensing (purchase) of local innovations 
v/hether through the patent system or otherwise;
3. registering copyrights fairly freely subject to the right to 
demand local publication if the estimated market is in 
excess of 1,000 copies (with the penalty forfeiture of copy­
right) and subject to the right to reproduce in whole or 
in part for educational use without payment of royalties;
4. ban registration of foreign trademarks (or “ get ups’’ or 
their extended family such as distinctive packagings) since 
these give no benefit to the consumer— quite the con­
trary;
5. however, take pov/ers under fair trading legislation to 
prevent fraudulent labelling especially as to nature, per­
formance, ingredients or quality but including deceptive 
naming where this is deemed by the authority to be 
likely to injure the consumer;
6. consider the informational and identification value of 
domestic trademark registration vis a vis the cost in 
terms of creating the basis for artificial “ product differen­
tiation based on “ disinformation’’.
34
Toirir-d Technology Codes
To c i ’e : c : " 'c ' : r y  cccc: ; re really cost reduction and use 
fcroide- ~g codes—Ii — it -g charges and removing restrictions 
c-i adaptation, product,on a~d expert. These objectives are 
v j ’.d but I.m tcd— they do net deal with broader "choice of 
technology" issues ar.d by lowering costs raising benefits of 
foreign technology they may actually inhibit the development 
of domestic knowledge creation, adaptation and application 
capacity. To fulfil these objectives requires other strategies, 
policies, institutions, programmes and laws. As they are— at 
least logically— compatible with the goals and working of exist­
ing technology codes and are so complex as to require far more 
space than is available, they will not be discussed further here.
The frst step for lawyers (or political economists) in this 
field should be to look at the better extant national legislation 
procedures, results and reasons for action e.g. Mexico, Andean 
pact, perhaps India (albeit that is relatively more scattered, 
bureaucratized and internally inconsistent but again also more 
firmly built into the national legal and state agency system). 
The next should be to examine what the actual forms of tech­
nology knowledge purchase are e.g. in Tanzania it is about 
90-95% machinery— plant— equipment, 2-5% contracts much 
broader than simple knowledge transfer, only 1-2% fees—  
licences— royalties of the type primarily dealt with by Andean 
Pact or Mexican approaches.
Only then can one usefully set out to identify specific 
national problems, goals, procedures. Following that, one can 
turn back to the existing codes to see what can be utilized, 
what needs to be adapted, what gaps require original national 
drafting.
V I
A  T rad e  U n io n  o f The Poor
It is— as Chairman Mao pointed out— useless to talk of ends 
without also identifying means. If, for example, one’s end is to 
cross a river, one must canvass ways and means of constructing 
a bridge or a ferry (or presumably a tunnel). The issue of 
mobilization of power has arisen several times in this paper. In 
that respect a quotation from President J. K. Nyerere’s George­
town, Guyana address is relevant:
W e  need a trade union of the poor.
Pushing analogies too far is unproductive but the trade 
union/Third W orld  one has more points of likeness relative to 
tome of the problems in achieving joint Third W orld  action 
than is usually realized:
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1. the interests of trade union members vis a vis each other 
are rarely identical— a joint position for external negotia­
tion must be based on a compromise or synthesis of 
targets among members;
2. there are usually quite wide diversities in status and 
bargaining power among sub-groups (especially within 
industrial, as opposed to craft, unions) with the best 
placed (e.g. artisans) under some temptation to split off 
and do a deal on their own— a situation not irrelevant 
to the “ differentiation”  issue within the Third W orld  and 
especially the attempts by the First W orld  to use it to do 
special deals with certain Third W orld  states e.g. Brazil, 
India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and— until early 1979-1 ran ;
3. external unity is not inconsistent with quite open internal 
dialogue so long as the dialogue does lead to agreed (even 
if perhaps limited) areas of joint action and does not open 
the way for outside “ divide and rule”  initiatives— a point, 
perhaps, against that brand of “ Third W orld ism ”  which 
argues against serious internal debate and glosses over 
differences;
4. trade union activities include both external struggle and 
internal solidarity (e.g. education, welfare, co-operative 
shop) aspects— a possible parallel to “ Trade Union of the 
Poor”  and “ Co-operation Against Poverty”  aspects of 
collective self reliance.
In te rac tio n — Tow ard  In tegration  and S ym e try
The most dramatic form of collective action by peripheral 
economies is that which involves struggle with industrial 
economies— the great symbolic successes are O PEC  on the 
operational level and the Charter of the Economic Rights and 
Duties of states on the international platform level, albeit the 
limping C IPEC (copper) and U N C TA D  quasi-negotiations are 
perhaps more typical. However, it is arguable that the most 
critical areas of collective self reliance in the medium term lie 
in building up interaction among peripheral economies. Evi­
dently the fields overlap— a joint enterprise of several states 
(as proposed in the context of the Latin American Economic 
System— SELA) for capital equipment purchasing may promote 
preferential intertrade and serve as a means to get better 
prices from industrial economy suppliers. More generally, the 
existence of an alternative set (or alternative sets) of inter­
national economic relations among peripheral economies is 
likely to increase their bargaining power vis a vis industrial 
economies.
The present patterns of global economic relations are dis­
tinctly disintegrated and non-symetrical. North-North and
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N o r t h - S o u t h  I• n<s :rc  much stronger than Scutb-Scuth. This 
is not limited to trade; it is just as true cf transport, communi­
cations. information and knowledge, technical cooperation, 
finance, raw material flows. This pattern greatly reduces peri­
pheral economy power individually— by limiting alternatives—  
and collectively— by ensuring fragmentation. It results in 
massive intermediation i.e. triangular South-North-South 
transactions often with the intermediary dominant. For 
example, the peripheral economies as a group over 1974-78 
had a surplus on current account i.e. the deficits which Third 
W orld  countries perceived themselves as meeting by borrow­
ing from the First W o rld — and perceived correctly so far as 
actual transactions were concerned— were actually being 
financed by the surpluses of other peripheral economies relent 
by denter financial institutions. A trade example concerns 
African hides and skins used by the shoe industries of the 
European periphery— almost all are sold to brokers/rnerchants 
based in Northern Europe who resell to the Southern European 
shoe factories, quite often without ever taking physical delivery 
but equally often at a more than 30% difference in price.
The record of direct South-South economic relations build­
ing is a mixed one. Neither the classic free trade area nor the 
fully institutionalized economic community has a very great 
record of success. Neither passive or facilitating measures (e.g. 
clearing unions, tariff preferences) nor coordinated planning 
(e.g. joint location schemes or regional factories) have had the 
results their proponents anticipated. However, it is equally 
true that the number of functional (if not always functioning 
well) multi country institutions and enterprise of political as 
well as intellectual interest and— perhaps most notably— of 
transactions of various types is growing not waning. The process 
may be one of three steps forward, two steps back on a rather 
eclectic trial and error model, but South-South action is 
increasing.
Possible Guideposts?
Some guideposts for further exploration may be useful:
1. while clearing or payments arrangements and tariff (or 
import licence) preferences facilitate trade, they do not 
cause it;
2. without commercial infrastructure (not just physical 
transport and communication but also commercial insti­
tutions. commercial dat3 flows and commercial credit 
availability) trade will ro t prosper;
3. interna:,’or,al trade is not an end in itself but a means to 
rva :c production potent-;.! or f.il production gaps, there-
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fore really rapid growth of trade is likely to require some 
mutual identification of, medium term arrangements as 
to, production as well as trade;
4. such arrangements may include selective regional plann­
ing (e-g- the Kagera Basin Scheme among Burundi, 
Rwanda, Tanzania and— hopefully— post Amin Uganda), 
sectoral planning (e.g. hydroelectric and fossil fuel power 
facilities for Namibia— Angola— Botswana), selected indus­
try specialization (e.g. the ASEAN  and Andean Pact 
regional industry programmes), multinational enterprises 
(e.g. the Venezeula-Colombia petrochemical-fertilizer- 
plastics group, the Eastern African National Shipping 
Line) or may be on a less institutional trade agreement 
and term contract basis, but at least in the short run will 
usually fall far short of overall planning coordination;
5. because the most crucial gap to building up links in other 
areas and to having nationally based development is the 
absence or intermediation through the North of specia­
lized (as well as general) knowledge, the recent emphasis 
on TCD C— Technical Cooperation Among Developing 
Countries— (and in the mass communication field on 
regional and Third W orld  press coordination and infor­
mation exchange bodies) is both sound and promising;
6. national, regional and global coordination and integration 
by the South can use Northern inputs, but must be South 
controlled ; therefore the use of T N C ’s (or their technical 
cooperation analogues, notably U N D P) should be limited 
both in the sense of a minority role in a Third W orld  run 
South-South framework and in that of using them only 
where, to the extent that, and so long as no South input 
is available;
7. no cooperation/integration/collective self reliance ven­
ture can prosper unless it serves interests of all its mem­
bers, serves them better than unilateral action would and 
is perceived in this light by relevant decision takers;
8. therefore, achieving a consensus on first steps, showing 
positive results from them and producing a division of 
gains and costs acceptable to decision takers (roughly no 
net lossers, some special treatment for the weakest, 
rough equity in any sense meaningful to participants) is 
much more critical than precise initial programme con­
tent or institutional form.
N eg o tia tion , Struggle  and Change
The maxim that the South (or sub-groups within it) must 
stand together in negotiations with the North is now widely 
accepted not only in principle but to a rather surprising (com-
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t=> j.*v— :?£0 cr even I960 .9/0) degree in prac-
r  f *T-c : :  dar :v c< me 77 in UNCTAD , the ACP in Lcrre. 
:- t “ Nc*v Cm--.or.wealth”  in the Commonwealth is no 
l--rcr 2 ~ ;:te r  for cynical, relaxed amusement cr condescend­
ing amazement by the North, but for some rethinking and 
rather mere attempts to co-opt otherwise positive slogans 
( ‘ Mere Aid ror The Poorest” , “ Human Rights” , “ Basic 
Needs” , “ Differentiation” , “ Newly Industrializing Coun­
tries” . “ Special Relationships” ) to the service of new “ divide 
and rule”  efforts to break a solidarity now seen as an emer­
gent reality actually beginning to alter the balance of power in 
a number of areas of structural negotiation. The February 1979 
decision of the 77 to pledge SI million each to the Common 
Fund’s equity (no matter how heated the dialogue before this 
was agreed and no m atterwhatone’sdoubts on how far forward 
the Common Fund will take the South) is a major example of 
this new commitment to joint action.Indeed in going not only 
beyond joint statements but also beyond joint negotiating 
stance to joint action to alter the context of negotiations it 
breaks new ground. (True OPEC had changed the context even 
more radically but it was a much smaller and— on the point at 
issue— more homogenous body than the 77.)
However, there are still real dangers. First some of the 
larger— and at the opposite end of the spectrum some of the 
weakest— Third W orld  states are tempted to revert to direct 
negotiations in cases when such action would break a joint 
position. Theonly v/ay to reduce the risk of this type of erosion 
is to achieve at least a few structural breakthroughs and a 
number of secondary gains. If the N IC ’s believe they must hang 
together or have their industrial exports to the North hung 
separately by protectionist lynch mobs, they will hang 
together. If they also see that in GATT they need the support 
of the least industrialized, they will perceive a point to standing 
firm on trade liberalization in respect to tropical and simply 
processed products. Collective self interest is a great rein­
forcer of solidarity.
Second, no global negotiations have yet been carried through 
to major success by the 77. True this is at one level the result 
of OECD  member intransigence (passively backed by the 
USSR at the last UN C TA D  albeit for reasons divergent from 
those of “ Group B ” — O EC D ) but it is not clear that the 77 as 
now organized have the information, analysis, personnel 
speed and flexibility in response to negotiate very effectively 
below the level of broad guidelines. Certainly the record in 
GATT and IMF suggests there are deficiencies here albeit that 
of ACP/EEC and O PEC  also suggests these can be overcome.
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Possib le P a rt ia l W a y s  Fo rw ard
Again a few suggestions for exploration may be of use in 
stimulating advances in thinking and practice:
1. different issues require different groupings of Third 
W orld  states e.g. commodity producers associations, 
textile/garment exporters, users of the services of a 
particular line conference;
2. as with “ cooperation against poverty”  South-South 
groupings, the basic tests for participation are perceived 
joint interests and ability of the group to develop common 
stances based on these interests (C IPEC  largely fails on 
the second test, failure on the first has meant to tea or 
cashew nut producers associations to date);
3. similarly membership in overlapping regional (e.g. an 
Eastern and a Southern African) or special purpose 
groups (e.g. dealing with Pacific and with Indian ocean 
shipping conferences) is not a sign of weakness but of 
vitality;
4. on the other hand, a plethora of relatively moribund 
bodies already exists so before creating more a clear 
common interest, a way to achieve it, a core of interested 
states and the means to pursue the chosen route should 
be demonstrated;
5. even in areas— e.g. GATT negotiations— in which a joint 
77 stance is needed, an overlapping set of sub-groups (some 
regional, some product) might well create more specific 
data and a lesser number of proposals allowing a clearer, 
better articulated and more effective set of bargaining 
proposals than starting with all 120 odd 77 member states 
working from a blank piece of paper;
6. while the 77 (or in some cases the Non-Aligned despite 
its weak Latin American representation) has become a 
fairly formidable mobilizer of power and bargaining force 
on some issues at macro or principle level, it has an uneven 
record there and a much less promising one at detailed 
negotiation level; becauseof person power shortages most 
peripheral economies cannot participate effectively in all 
negotiating form suggesting that constituency chosen 
representatives (balanced by similar limits on total First 
and Second W orld  participants) might, in some forums, 
increase Third W orld  impact especially in detailed negotia­
tions or on technical subjects;
7. a weakness of most Third W orld  “ trade union”  bodies 
(notably not of O PEC ) is the absence of any adequate 
technical secretariat to collect and analyze information,
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• V c  cr*c c* : ke 77.
fi. to j.ppcse \*iz 2 g’cba! body (e g. U N C T A D ) can play 
Sjch a rc'c s « !h'_! th - K -g — ary glebe! body is rcspcn- 
s.b e (2nd rcspor.j.vc) to a11 (or almost ail e.g. South 
Afr.ca's v.c«vs C3n rorma'ly be ignored) its members and 
if it is to be a negotiating forum and “ honest broker ’ (as 
UN CTAD  tries to be) an essential condition is that all 
parties have confidence in its being relatively impartial 
among states or groups of states;
9. indeed by securing the image of a “ Third W o r ld "  body 
in the North, while being heavily First W orld  staffed and 
influenced, U N CTAD  has weakened its potential as a 
negotiating forum/"honest b roker" without providing a 
technical capacity really under the control of the Third 
W orld . Perhaps worse it has made “ honest b roker" 
compromise proposals (e.g. the Common Fund, Techno­
logy Transfer) which were very far short of any reasonable 
Third W orld  initial demands, but which in the absence of 
clear 77 articulated proposals become de facto the Third 
W orld  starting point and thus meant that any compromise 
was away from the “ middle of the road" U N CTAD  
position and to the Group B side. It is rarely good negotiat­
ing tactics for one side to start with what may be an 
acceptable “ final bargain" rather than its own full goals 
when the other side is certain to start with its own pre­
ferred solution (not a compromise), but that is precisely 
the result U N C T A D ’s proposals for the Common Fund 
had in the absence of a clear, detailed, technically articu­
lated 77 position.
Identifying, G rouping, A cting
Third W orld  states have on several occasions failed to act 
when they had the formal power to do so within existing 
institutional structures and/or failed to see the broader 
problems into which certain lines of specialized negotiations 
were leading. Part of the cause appears to be inadequate use 
of— or contributions by— lawyers. Only in the Law of the Sea 
Conference have most Third W orld  states deployed an array 
of legal talent; but there are lega; aspects to all or almost all 
major international political economic issues not just those 
labelled “ Law o f..
For example the 1977 Amendments to the IMF Articles were 
woefully unsatisfactory from a Third W orld  point of view.-The 
major capitalist industrial states achieved the main changes they 
wanted, the Third W o r ld ’s three key targets— a successor to
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the Group of 20 with 50% Third W orld  members and specified 
powers over broad financial policy issues, a guaranteed issue 
schedule for SD R ’s (Special Drawing Rights) adequate to move 
them over 10-15 years to the position of a central reserve asset 
at least comparable with the dollar, the creation of an SDR- 
Development Link (the cause for which N. M. Perera had so 
ably mobilized peripheral economy Finance Ministers on earlier 
occasions) allocating the bulk of SD R ’s to low income states—  
were not included. True, SDR issues were possible (but not 
guaranteed and with no link) as was the Special Council or 
Committee (but with no guarantee of activation and with 
provision for 65'% capitalist industrial economy voting stren­
gth). All there was for the periphery was a modest bribe— a 
share of the proceeds of gold sales would go into a soft loan 
fund. This dismal package was endorsed as the best that could 
be had by the Group of Twenty Four (in a sense the Central 
Bankers’ sub-committee of the Group of 77 but a self appointed 
one with no forma! linkage or responsibility to it). Very few 
Third W orld  states (at least one— Tanzania) voted no.
W here  is the legal issue? To amend the Articles requires 
not simply a high per cent of the votes— the North could 
muster that with only marginal South backing— but also the 
approval of two thirds of the member states. Three quarters of 
the member states of the IMF are Third W orld . The major indust­
rial economies very much wanted the parity and gold changes 
in the package. Had there been a firm South position there is 
every reason to believe a better package could have been had, 
but the Third W orld  side seemed largely unaware that, for 
once, it held a legal blocking power if two thirds of its members 
stood together and voted no or abstained.
Similarly in the Transfer of Technology dialogue— as already 
noted— there is a danger of reaching a “ compromise”  leaving 
the law of the contract up to negotiation by the parties in each 
case. Adequate legal advice should have forewarned those 
offering this concession of its sweeping implications for other 
areas of international economic transactions.
M ob ilisa tion , Change, Law
It is, unfortunately, hard to identify a case in which mobiliza­
tion has been successful on the basis of a legal input. It is true 
that the only coherent draft articles for the Common Fund are 
Third W orld  (Marga institute) drafted and that this draft has 
had some influence on negotiating positions. However, if the 
Common Fund is salvaged in a worthwhile form two quite 
different mobilizing acts will have been critical:
I. the December 1977 semi-walkout by the 77, refusing to 
accept another papered over statement o f ‘progress’when
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the Group B position remained a wrecking or delaying to 
eternity due— serving clear warning that either the 
talks had to make genuine progress or end in real con­
frontation ;
2. the February 1979,77 commitment of $1 million per state 
to the basic equity to force Group B ’s hand on the equity 
capital (and voting power) issues.
True, law is not usually a mobilizing instrument for those 
seeking to change the status quo. Political action is much more 
critical for those on the side of major structural change. How­
ever, the absence of lawyers from the mobilizing process can 
be demonstrated to have lost potential gains (the IMF case) and 
endangered hardwon past gains (the law of contract case). 
Further it is probable that were lawyers more directly involved 
they could play a useful supporting role in mobilization of Third 
W orld  political economic negotiating power over a wider 
array of cases than those cited.
Stru ctu rin g  for A ctio n
The cite an African proverb:
The shadow of a man drives the fish, 
but unless there is a net, 
no fish are caught.
Mobilisation of power is primarily the duty and the possibi­
lity of politicians— that is the shadow to drive states and TNCs 
into serious negotiation. But the counterpart is devising struc­
tures, contexts (legal and other) and institutions which con­
stitute a fine meshed net. That is in large part the business of 
technocrats and intellectuals advising, articulating, acting on 
political decisions and it is a duty which has not been very well 
performed to date perhaps especially by intellectuals (whether 
political economists or lawyers).
Part of this issue relates to institutional structures, their 
“ constitutions”  and procedures and their interactions. Here 
a few skeletal comments can serve:
1. regional, special product, sectoral (e.g. communications, 
development banking), functional (e.g. clearing unions), 
and operating (multistate joint ventures) bodies with self 
selected membership and workable goals— procedures—  
divisions of costs/benefits are slowly becoming of increas­
ing weight and could in many cases do so more rapidly if 
their technical (legal, economic, managerial) personpower 
was more adequate in numbers and more innovative irt 
approach;
2. there is a need for developing interrelationships among 
such bodies— perhaps logically via specialized groups or
43
committees (e.g. for Regional Clearing and Payments 
Unions, Conferences of Central Bankers) under the aegis 
of the Group of 77 (or the Non-Aligned). To work well 
these committees would need at least a small permanent 
secretariat for data collection and analysis, identification 
of opportunities for collaboration, responding to group 
requests for articulated programmes;
3. in some negotiating forums, and in some stages of most 
negotiations,Third W orld  interests would be betterserved 
by having groups of 14-30 negotiators (one half Third 
W orld ) chosen by constituencies of countries. These are 
not levels at which a majority of votes helps much but 
they are forums in which specialist knowledge is essential. 
The latter can be secured on the Third W orld  side only 
if each state has only a limited number of groups to 
participate in, and can be enhanced if there is a backup 
secretariat to provide the Third W orld  representatives 
with information and specific research on request. (The 
model is the Group of 20 on Monetary Reform whose 9 
elected Third W orld  members were able to represent 
their “ constituencies”  effectively, to mobilize adequate 
technical expertise and to call on a secretariat responsible 
to them). For detailed negotiations the added point arises 
that 100-125 participants is not a workable number— 20 
is rathermore optimal forachieving results which are then 
subject to approval (or otherwise) by a plenary of all 
participating states and by their governments;
4. the Group of 77 (and other broad membership Third 
W orld  groups like the Non-Aligned) need to develop 
greater articulation of a broader range of targets, to 
translate these into clearer negotiating proposals, to 
elaborate tactics and fallback positions so that they can 
respond to counter-proposals and compromise offers 
and to have an independent technical/analytical/d3ta base 
both for elaborating and for defending their negotiating 
positions. Barring virtually continuous sessions of senior 
77 officials working from national data and detailed pro­
posals, this appears to require a permanent Third W orld  
technical secretariat responsible to the Conference of 
Ministers.
A  T h ird  W o r ld  Se c re ta r ia t?
Each of the above propositions has legal implications—  
constitutions, elections, procedures, intergroup relations, legal 
data and analysis, servicing negotiations. Each also suggests 
that a key missing element in South-South cooperation is a 
permanent Third W orld  Secretariat.
44
T>e reed for rrore data a'd  analysis to back up Trade Union 
c ‘ th e Poor po!»tical mobilization is no longer widely disputed— 
at least in the South. The impossibility of seeing U N C T A D ’S 
secretariat as more than an interim substitute and perhaps a 
longer term source of specialized technical assistance has been 
argued. The Third W orld  Forum— occasionally nominated for 
this role— is a group of intellectuals whose critical, ideological 
and prophetic roles are hardly compatible with being an inter­
governmental research unit. Bodies like the Centre for Re­
search on N IEO  can play a supportive role but are unlikely 
ever to h3ve the resources (or the breadth of confidence among 
77 states) to be a real substitute.
W hat are the real problems:
1. location of headquarters;
2. initial secretary general;
3. selection of staff;
4. finance;
5. powers and responsibilities.
These have embrangled progress to date— hopefully the 
exploratory committee appointed by the 77 at its Arusha Con­
ference represents the beginning of a breakthrough. On each 
issue lawyers could do much to reduce real fears and to smooth 
procedural problems:
1. select an interim location in a Third W orld  country not 
large enough or ideologically prominent enough to be 
likely to dominate the institution and with good trans­
port and communication links— e.g. Malta;
2. choose secretary general’s for six year non-renewable 
terms with the first a distinguished economic (e.g. 
Finance, Planning, Commerce) minister personally known 
and respected by many 77 ministers, with clear views and 
an ability to develop them but also of demonstrated 
ability to work with those of divergent views (the 77 is 
far from homogenous on many issues). Again he should 
be a citizen of a respected state but not one so strong as 
to be able to dominate (e.g. not Brazil, India) nor one 
perceived as so rigid in its position as to raise worries by 
a large number of the 77’s members;
3. if each state was entitled to name 4 professional staff and 
the Secretary General in consultation with a Steering 
Committee elected by the 77 to name 75 more (subject 
to a ceiling of 15 from any one state) a total of about 500 
professionals— or distinctly more than the minimum 
needed— would be to hand with no danger of dominance 
by one state or group;
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4. the^ budget requirement of— say— $25 million (at full 
staff) could be handled if states expected results. If staff 
were seconded and the seconding state paid their salary 
to the Secretariat as part of its contribution, this would 
cover over half the cost. The balance could be collected 
on a scale ranging from $20,000 for the smallest states to 
$500,000 for the largest. In fact the initial staff and budget 
are likely to be much smaller;
5. evidently the 77's Conference of Ministers must have the 
power to give general guidelines and to request specific 
services from the Secretariat. The Guidelines may include 
negative ones— e.g. A Secretariat concentrating its atten­
tion on “ how to speed the replacement of capitalist by 
socialist modes of production”  would have a very short 
life expectancy; some rules and self denying ordinances 
are needed to avoid divisive and self destructive (to the 
77 and to the Secretariat respectively) initiatives. On the 
other hand, the Secretariat needs the freedom to use its 
professional judgement, to formulate technical proposals, 
to offer suggestions as to possible lines of action to the 
77 and potential committees (e.g. of Central Bankers, 
Payments Unions, Preferential Trading Areas). No in­
soluble problems need arise— any major technical secre­
tariat has similar problems and parameters. A widely 
supported Secretary General, a broadly agreed set of 
Guidelines, a Steering Committee for Ministerial/Secre­
tariat liaison and a responsible staff should find no major 
problems (as opposed to secondary tensions) in this field.
In each of the “ answers”  sketched above, a legal component 
can be critical. This is especially true of the last. W hether 
formal Guidelines or formal Conference of Ministers/Steering 
Committee/Secretariat divisions of duties and powers can 
solve operational problems may be debatable. However, it is 
beyond doubt that badly drafted ones can cause problems.
Further it is probable that carefully drafted ones can—  
probably quite rightly— allay some of the real anxieties which 
have to date baulked the institution of a Third W orld  Secre­
tariat to the benefit of the defenders of the Old International 
Economic Order and to the grave detriment of Trade Union of 
the Poor action.
V II
In Conclusion: A  V a led iction  En jo in ing  M orn ing
A great poem by a British author is titled A Valediction 
Forbidding Mourning”  but what we need in respect of lawyers 
role in trade and development is a valediction enjoining morn­
ing. There are too many darknesses— of lawyers who say why
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cr r :w  v.hat is needed cannot be dene instead of dc\ctirg 
their mine's to How it can or might be dene. There ere tco 
many ncn-lawyers (in government o* in universities) who see 
lawyers as hack translators to “ put it into legal” . There are 
too many on both sides who refuse to learn enough about each 
others disciplines, constraints and potential contributions to 
be able to hold a mutually intelligible dialogue, let alone to 
work together as a team united for common goals.
This paper does not purport to be— and I hope is not read 
as— a political economist “ laying down the law”  to lawyers. It 
is an attempt by a political economist who has worked closely 
and to his (and hopefully to their and their common clients’ !) 
benefit with lawyers to illustrate some aspects of the present 
trade and development struggle and to show some areas in 
which law and lawyers have a basic contribution to make and 
should be far more integrally involved (especially on the 1 hird 
W orld side) than they are today. As such it is as much as 
injunction to political economists as to lawyers and may indeed 
be as provocative in the interactions it suggests to the one 
profession as to the other. Its message in that respect is in­
tended to be to cease to throw disciplines at each other like 
hand grenades and come together to unite the disciplines in a 
joint barrage on the problems, a joint struggle to achieve 
patterns of trade which actually are supportive of (not con­
straints on or inimical to) development.
That will be a long and arduous struggle. It will require 
identifying, mobilizing and organizing Third W orld  power— 
not simply in general terms but also on issue by issue, sector 
by sector and case by case levels. It will require deploying 
analysis, selection and negotiation to win not merely overarching 
Charters but specific institutional, structural and contractual 
changes. To do this will require better political economic and 
sociological as well as legal analysis— better in the sense of 
relevance to Third W orld  realities, responsiveness to Third 
W orld  needs, application to solving real practical problems and 
within these parameters considerably higher professional com­
petence and inventiveness.
No one should know better than lawyers that sweeping 
break-throughs are few and that even they are usually built on 
arduous step by step work which, in and of itself, is not very 
exciting but is often very exacting. It is a lesson that one hopes 
they (like the makers of successful revolutions— violent or 
otherwise— who from a very different perspective have a similar 
grasp on this aspect of reality) can convey to social scientists—  
academic and technocratic— and to decision takers who are. 
perhaps, too prone to visualize the end without adequate 
attention to the nature of necessary and possible means.
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